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Abstract
The supply of cryptotokens or cryptocurrencies can be indefinitely expanded on the ex-
tensive margin by introducing new cryptotokens and cryptocurrencies. Here we propose a
theoretical model in which this extensive margin is endogenous. We do so by considering
the choice of entry and subsequent competitive dynamics among blockchain-based decen-
tralized digital platforms, each having an associated cryptotoken. We find that, if there
are developers who can self-finance the development of their platforms, then the equilib-
rium is a monopoly in which a single platform (and a single token) enters the market. If
these developers are absent, then entry is possible only by holding an Initial Coin Offering
(ICO). We show that ICOs weaken incentives, because in equilibrium there is a strictly
positive probability that a developer who held an ICO will then liquidate all his tokens
and hence stop the development of his platform. This, however, stimulates entry because
each developer might become a monopolist with strictly positive probability. We show
that, under certain conditions, welfare is higher when multiple developers enter via ICOs
than when a single developer self-finance the development of the platform.
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In the opening paragraph of “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (the
Bitcoin whitepaper) Nakamoto (2008) writes
Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on fi-
nancial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic
payments. [...] What is needed is an electronic payment system based
on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties
to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third
party.
After stating his objective, Nakamoto (2008) then proceeds to introduce two innova-
tions. The first one is Bitcoin, a new digital currency. The second, more important,
is the bitcoin protocol, an open-source software allowing a network of anonymous,
selfish participant to maintain a record of Bitcoin transactions. Because these trans-
actions are grouped into “blocks” that are then “chained” (i.e., linked) together to
form an immutable history, this technology became known as blockchain. Impor-
tantly, the bitcoin protocol also regulates the total number of bitcoins in existence
in every period, which is set to increase over time at a decreasing rate so to never
exceed 21 millions. At the onset of Bitcoin (in early 2009), Nakamoto created and
kept to himself approximately 1 million Bitcoin, before ceasing to contribute to the
development of the Bitcoin protocol in mid-2010.
Enterprising developers soon realized that blockchain technology can be used to
maintain not only records of Bitcoin transactions, but any type of record.1 This led
to the creation of hundreds other decentralized digital platforms—where a decentral-
ized digital platform is the network of users of a given blockchain based-protocol.
In addition to several other cryptocurrencies (such as Monero, ZCash, Litecoin, ...),
there are now several decentralized computing platforms (see Ethereum, EOS, Car-
1 Occasionally a distinction is made between blockchain and decentralized ledger technologies,
where blockchain refers to a specific way of maintaining a decentralized ledger. This distinction is
not relevant for the purpose of this paper. Another distinction is between “blockchain” meaning
the technology, and “the blockchain” meaning a specific application of the blockchain technology,
usually the Bitcoin blockchain. Here we always mean the technology.
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dano, NEO, Algorand, ...);2 decentralized real-time gross settlement platforms (see
Ripple, Stellar); decentralized marketplaces for storage and hosting of files (see SIA,
Filecoin, Storj) or for renting in/out CPU cycles (see Golem); generic e-commerce
decentralized digital platforms (see Openbazaar); decentralized prediction markets
(see Augur, Gnosis), financial exchanges (see 0xproject), and financial derivatives
(see MakerDAO); and many more.
Importantly, a decentralized digital platform can function only if some of its
users perform costly actions—mining being the prime example. These users must
be adequately rewarded, which is achieved via the creation of a specific blockchain-
based token. The protocol powering the decentralized digital platform automatically
allocates new tokens to the users who perform such costly actions. At the same time,
the protocol specifies that the token is necessary in order to use the corresponding
platform—usually as its internal currency. Finally, the supply of tokens is finite in
every period, and is pre-specified at the protocol level. As a consequence, to the
extent that the platform is used, its associated token will have positive value and
therefore can be used to create incentives at the protocol level.3
This, in turns, implies that tokens can also be used to generate off-protocols
incentives. For exampe, tokens can be used to raise funds in an Initial Coin Offering
(ICO). In an ICO, the developer of a blockchain-based decentralized digital platform
sells some of the associated tokens to investors, in exchange for capital to be used
for the development of the platform. The first notable ICO was that of Ethereum in
2014, raising USD 2.3 million in approximately 12 hours. ICO activity exploded in
2017 and, especially, in 2018, with ICOs raising more that USD 6 billion in a single
month (July 2018, from Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti, 2018).4 Furthermore, the
sale of tokens not sold at ICO allows the developers of decentralized digital platofrom
to profit from their work, despite the fact that these plaforms are open source and
2 A decentralized computing platform can be seen as an operating system running over a network
of computers rather than a single machine. Developers can then create software (which in this
context are smart contracts) that is executed by the network rather than by a single machine.
3 For an economic analysis of these incentives for the case of Bitcoin, see, for example Biais,
Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2019) and Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017).
4 For comparison, in 2016 total Venture Capital investment in Europe was USD 4.7 billion
(OECD, 2017).
1 Introduction 4
free to use. This novel business model is called seigniorage.5
The introduction of decentralized digital platforms and the explosion ICOs raised
important concerns. One in particular is the fact that blockchain-based tokens are
simultaneously performing many functions: they regulate access to decentralized
digital platforms, they allow to raise financing, they generate profits. In a traditional
platform, instead, each of these functions can be performed by a different instrument
(prices, debt, and equity, respectively). Because of this, the incentives faced by the
developers of decentralized digital platforms may be far from optimal.
This paper contributes to the understanding of these incentives by studying
theoretically the entry of competing decentralized digital platforms in the same
market. A market here is defined by all decentralized digital platforms that allow
users to perform a given action. Examples are the market for cryptocurrencies
(i.e. the set of decentralized digital platforms that can be used to send and receive
crypto-tokens with money-like properties), the market for decentralized computing
platforms (i.e., the set of decentralized digital platforms that can be used to run
smart contracts), the market for decentralized exchanges of various types (i.e., the
set of decentralized digital platforms that can be used to trade a given object—
could be CPU cycles, personal data, or various digital objects). Competition among
different blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms is assumed winner-take-all,
which is justified by the presence of strong network externalities. Because to each
decentralized digital platform entering the market is associated a specific crypto-
token, in our model the number of crypto-tokens in existence is endogenous.
In the model, at the beginning of the game each developer decides whether
to hold an ICO, and, immediately after, whether to pay an entry cost. In case a
developer did not hold an ICO, this entry cost can only be paid using the developer’s
own resources. In case a developer held an ICO, this entry cost can be paid using
both the developer’s own resources and the proceedings from the ICO. Importantly,
if a developer held an ICO, then in every subsequent period a frictionless market
5 See Canidio (2018). Seigniorage are profits earned by issuing currency, and is clearly not a
novel concept. What is novel in this context is the fact that seigniorage can be used to finance
innovation. Note that Howell, Niessner, and Yermack (2018) and Amsden and Schweizer (2018)
show that projects that go through an ICO sell only about half of their tokens at ICO, with the
rest being kept by the founding team. This indicates that projects that go through an ICO expect
to sell as many tokens at ICO as on the market post-ICO.
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for tokens opens, in which investors and the developer can buy and sell tokens.6
All developers who paid the entry cost exert effort in the development of their
respective platforms. The developer who exerts the highest effort is the winner,
and his platform is the one adopted by users. After the winner is determined, all
developers liquidate their tokens and exit the game, while users continue using the
winning platform indefinitely. Our measure of welfare is the volume of transactions
occurring in each period on the winning platform, which depends on the effort
exerted by the winning developer.
To start, we show that competition is beneficial: having multiple competitors
always leads to higher welfare than having a single competitor, although increasing
the number of competitors beyond 2 does not always increases welfare. This reflects
both on the value of the winning platform and on the total value of all tokens
associated with the competing platforms. Our second result is that, as it is often
the case, outside financing (here in the form of an ICO) weakens incentives. This
weakening of incentives here takes a specific form: if a market for tokens is present,
then, in equilibrium, with strictly positive probability each developer will liquidate
all his tokens and stop the development of the protocol.7 The intuition is that,
if investors expect a developer to hold on to his tokens, then they should also
expect this developer to exert high effort in the future, which implies that the
price of the token associated with the developer’s platform should be high. But
then, the developer should sell all his tokens, so to “cash in” on his future effort
before exerting any. Similarly, if investors expect low effort tomorrow, then the
price of the developer’s token will be low, which implies that the developer should
hold on to most of his tokens and exert high effort tomorrow. Each developer is
therefore engaged in a anti-coordination game with investors, which implies that the
equilibrium must be in mixed strategies: each developer sells all his tokens on the
market with strictly positive probability, and holds on to as many tokens as possible
otherwise.
6 Usually, tokens sold at ICO start trading on specialized financial exchanges immediately after
the end of the ICO. Sometimes a lockup mechanism prevents those tokens from being traded.
This lockup period can last between a few months to a year. Note, however, that sophisticated
investors can circumvent it via the creation of future markets. Also, the length of this lockup
period is minimal relative to time required to develop the platform
7 This result is already in Canidio (2018), who however considers a single developer.
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An important implication is that, if there is a developer who paid the entry cost
without holding an ICO, this developer will for sure reach the final stage of the game.
In this case, competition ensures that a second developer who pays the entry cost
will earn zero profits in the following period. Hence, no other developer will want
to pay the entry cost. If instead all developers who paid the entry cost also held an
ICO, then each of these developers may liquidate all his tokens before reaching the
final stage of the game. That is, when paying the entry cost, each developer knows
that, with strictly positive probability, he may be the only developer reaching the
final stage of the game. In this case, multiple developers may find it profitable to
pay the entry cost.
Building on the above insight, we then solve for the equilibrium number of en-
trants. Depending on the developers’ initial wealth, there are three cases. In the
first one, there are developers who can self-finance the entry cost. In this case, no
ICO occurs in equilibrium and a single developer enters the market. In the second
case, all developers are very poor relative to the cost of entry, and there are no ICOs
nor entry. Intuitively, a developer who is very poor will need to sell many tokens
at ICO to raise enough resources to then pay the entry cost. But this leaves this
developer with few tokens, which means that his future profits in case he pays the
entry cost are low. As a consequence, for this developer paying the entry cost may
not be incentive compatible.
The last case occurs for intermediate levels of wealth: developers are poor but
not so poor to be unable to hold an ICO. We solve this case by assuming that
all developers have the same initial wealth. We show that there is an equilibrium
in which no ICO occurs, together with an equilibrium in which there are multiple
ICOs. The reason is that, if investors believe that the developer will not have the
incentive to pay the entry cost, then they will be unwilling to purchase tokens at
ICO, which implies that the developer will indeed be unable to pay the entry cost.
If investors instead expect high effort in the future, the price of the token will be
high. Each developer will be able to keep a large amount of tokens at ICO (while
simultaneously paying the entry cost), which implies that future effort will be high.
We then compare welfare in the three cases above. Clearly, the lowest level of
welfare is achieved when all developers are extremely poor (case 2 above), or when
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developers have an intermediate level of wealth but an inferior equilibrium with no
ICOs nor entry emerges (case 3 above). However, the comparison between the case
with no ICO and monopoly (case 1 above) and the case of multiple ICOs (case 3
above) is ambiguous. In case 1, a single developer will enter the market and reach
the final stage of the game with probability 1. In case 3, multiple developers enter
the market. Each of them has some probability of exiting the market prematurely.
But it is also possible that multiple developers reach the final stage of the game—
in which case competition guarantees a higher level of effort than in case 1. We
show that, relative to no ICO and a monopoly, welfare is higher with multpile
ICOs whenever developers are not too poor—that is, outside financing is present
but limited. An interesting corollary is that increasing the cost of entering into the
market may increase welfare. If the cost is such that some developers can pay it
using their own funds, then in equilibrium there is a monopoly. If the cost increases
(via, for example, a tax) then all developers may need to resort to an ICO to be able
to pay it. This generates competition and, if this tax is not too large, also increases
welfare relative to the monopoly case.
Literature
Competition, cryptocurrencies, and crypto-tokens. To the best of our knowl-
edge, ours is the first paper to study entry and competition among decentralized
digital platforms. However, few existing papers investigate related questions. For
example, Gandal and Halaburda (2016) study empirically the price movements of
various cryptocurrencies between May 2013 and July 2014. They find evidence of
strong network effects and winner-take-all dynamics toward the end of their sample
period, but not at the beginning. Also closely related are general-equilibrium mod-
els of competition between traditional currencies and cryptocurrencies (see Garratt
and Wallace, 2018, Schilling and Uhlig, 2019, Benigno, Schilling, and Uhlig, 2019).
Importantly for our purposes, these papers take as given both the choice of entry
and the overall “quality” of these currencies. In addition, they focus exclusively on
cryptocurrencies.
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Tokens and decentralized digital platforms. The literature studying tokens and
decentralized digital platforms has so far largely ignored the choice of entry of de-
centralize digital platform and the subsequent competitive dynamics.
Within this literature, the most closely related paper is a previous work of ours
(Canidio, 2018), in which a developer can exert effort and invest funds in the de-
velopment of a decentralized digital platform over several periods. The developer
holds the initial stock of tokens and can choose when to hold an ICO. Following the
ICO, in every period there is a frictionless market for tokens where investors and
the developer himself can trade tokens. Relative to Canidio (2018), here we allow
the developers to invest and exert effort only once. Also, the choice of when to hold
the ICO is simplified to two options: either initially or before exiting the game. Of
course, here the number of developers is endogenous and could be greater than one,
while in Canidio (2018) there is a unique developer.
Also closely related are Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) and Goldstein, Gupta, and
Sverchkov (2019). Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) build a model in which the owner of
a decentralized digital platform continuously creates new tokens which can be either
sold (and the proceedings consumed) or used to pay workers who will improve the
value of the platform. In Goldstein, Gupta, and Sverchkov (2019) an entrepreneur
chooses whether to create a decentralized digital platform or a traditional platform.
Their main result is that creating a decentralized digital platform generates compe-
tition among the users of the (unique) platform. Here instead we study competition
among platforms.
Sockin and Xiong (2018), Cong, Li, and Wang (2018), Bakos and Halaburda
(2018), and Li and Mann (2018) consider a single decentralized digital platform, and
argue that because of network externalities there could be coordination failures in its
adoption. They study the role of tokens and they way they are sold in achieving the
high-adoption equilibrium. Finally, a number of authors have studied ICOs held by
firms that are not building decentralized digital platforms and may even completely
unrelated to blockchain. In this case, a token may represent a voucher and therefore
give the right to acquire a good or a service from the issuer, or may represent a claim
on a business’ revenues, or a claim on a business’ profits. This use of blockchain-
based tokens is studied in Catalini and Gans (2018), Chod and Lyandres (2018) and
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Garratt and van Oordt (2019), Malinova and Park (2018). Again, all these papers
study this problem by considering a single firm.
Contest theory and platform competition. The core of our model is a winner-
take-all contest with asymmetric players and valuable effort. The main theoretical
reference is therefore Siegel (2014), who provides conditions under which these types
of contests have an equilibrium, and show that the equilibrium payoffs of all partic-
ipants is the same in all equilibria of the game.
Finally, the literature studying competitions among (traditional) platforms has
focused mostly on the resulting equilibrium prices (see, for example, the seminal
work by Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Armstrong, 2006, and Caillaud and Jullien, 2003).
Here this issue is not present because decentralized digital platforms are free pro-
vided that the corresponding tokens is used. Hence, profits are generated exclusively
by the sale of tokens. Despite this, our research question is related to Kristiansen and
Thum (1997), who study R&D choice when there are network externalities. In their
model, however, network extrnalities are at the market level—users benefit of using
a product depends on the total number of users of all products in the market—while
here the user of each platform cannot interact with users on a different platform.
2 The Model
The economy is composed of a large mass of developers, a large mass of risk-neutral
price-taking investors, and a large mass of users. Developers are heterogeneous
in their initial wealth ai, but are identical in all other respects. Each developer i
entering the market creates his own platform (also indexed by i) and establishes that
all transactions using his/her platform must be conducted using a specific token (also
indexed by i) with total supply M , fully owned by the developer at the beginning of
the game.8 The development of the protocol lasts 2 periods. In the first one, each
developer invests I i ∈ {0, C}, where we interpret C > 0 as a market-entry cost. In
the second one, each developer exerts effort ei, which is productive only if he/she
8 As we will show later, equilibrium actions, payoffs and prices are independent of M , provided
that it is strictly positive and finite. We therefore treatM as a parameter common to all developers
rather that a choice variable.
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previously paid the entry cost. All developers exit the game at the end of period 2.
Each developer can choose to hold an ICO either at the beginning of the game
(in period t = 0) or before exiting the game (in period t = 2). An ICO is modeled
as an auction, in which a developer sells some tokens to investors. If developer i
held an ICO in period t, then at the end of every subsequent period a frictionless
market for token i opens. In this market, investors and developer i can trade token
i. Developers and investors can also hold a risk-free asset yielding a per-period gross
return R ≥ 1.
From period 3 onward, all users adopt a single decentralized digital platform. We
call such platform the winning platform w, which we define in the next paragraph.
More precisely, in every t > 3 first the market for token w opens and then users use
the winning platform. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the timeline.
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints.
They can purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequent
period. Importantly, when buying or selling tokens on the market, they are price
takers: their net demand for tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token
prices from period t onward, which they take as given.
Call pit the price of token i in period t, which could be determined on the market
or in an ICO. Investors are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens
i in period t whenever they expect the token to yield the risk-free return, that


























then the investors’ demand for token i in period t is not defined.
Users. Because of network externalities, from t = 3 onward, all user will use the
winning platform to transact with each other. To do so, in every period they first
purchase token w, and then use it to transact with other users on platform w. The
total value (in US dollars) of all exchanges occurring on the wining platform during
a given period is the value of the winning platform and is equal to the developer’s
effort ew. This assumption is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the fact
that the developer’s effort generates an improvement of the platform (i.e., lower
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transaction costs, enhanced ease of use, increased security and reliability), which in
turns allows more users to use the platform and perform more/larger transactions.
We abstract away from possible coordination failures by assuming that users use
the platform with the highest value, so that
w ≡ argmaxi{ei}
In case more then one platform have the same, highest value, then a tie breaking
rule determines which platform is the winner (the exact nature of this tie breaking
rule is irrelevant for the calculations below).
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Finally, each user can access the market for tokens only once in every period.9
This implies that, in every t ≥ 3, those who use the winning protocol to purchase
goods and services have a demand for tokens equal to ew
pwt
, while those who use the




The developers. Call Qit the stock of token i held by developer i at the beginning





It follows that, in period 2, a developer sets effort ei so to maximize




Given this, in period 1 each developer chooses Qi2 ∈ [0,M ] and I i ∈ {0, C} so to
maximize
U i1 ≡ U i2 +
(
(ai + pi0(M −Qi1))R− I i − pi1(Qi2 −Qi1)
)
R
subject to a cash constraint







Note that pi0(M − Qi1) are the proceeds of the ICO, invested in the risk free asset
in period 0 together with the initial wealth. Hence, the term (ai + pi0(M − Qi1))R
represents the developer’s wealth at the beginning of period 1. Note also that if
pi1(Q
i
2 − Qi1) > 0, then this term represents the resources spent by the developer
to purchase his own token on the market in period 1 (which matters for the cash
9 That is, the winning token has velocity 1. Assuming a different, exogenous velocity will
introduce an additional parameter without affecting the results. The velocity of tokens could,
however, be endogenous as in Prat, Danos, and Marcassa (2019). As we will see later, the important
element here is that the price of the winning token increases with the effort exerted by the winning
developer. We believe that this result (and, as a consequence, all results presented here) extends
to the case in which the velocity of the token is endogenous. Endogenizing the velocity of the token
however opens the possibility that developers may try to manipulate the price of tokens by taking
actions that do not affect the value of their platform but rather the velocity of the related token.
We plan to explore this possibility in future work.
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constraint).10 If instead pi1(Qi2 − Qi1) < 0 then this term represents the resources
earned by selling additional tokens on the market in period 1.
The cash constraint therefore says that the agent wealth at the beginning of
period 1 cannot exceed the amount invested I i plus the amount spent to purchase
tokens on the market. Also, the term (ai + pi0(M − Qi1))R − I i − pi1(Qi2 − Qi1) is
the developer’s total wealth at the end of period 1, after choosing Qi2 ∈ [0,M ] and
I i ∈ {0, C}. This wealth earns the risk-free return and is consumed at the end of
period 2. Finally, if there was no ICO in period 0, then the period-1 maximization
problem is subject to the additional feasibility constraint Qi1 ≡M .
In period 0, the developer chooses whether to hold an ICO and how many tokens
to sell at ICO so to maximize his continuation utility U i1. We assume full information,
so that whether a developer paid the entry cost, his/her effort, and his/her token
holdings are observable by investors, users, and other developers.
Equilibrium. We solve the model by backward induction, starting from the price
of the winning token, then moving to solving for the equilibrium effort, the market
equilibrium in period 1 (if an ICO occurred), the choice of paying the entry cost,
and finally the choice of whether to hold an ICO.
As we will see, at each stage there may be multiple equilibria. When this is the
case, we apply a forward induction refinement: at the beginning of the subgame,
we allow a single developer to take a useless-but-costly action, which is observable
by other developers but not by investors nor users.11 Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992)
show that this developer is able to “signal his future action.” The intuition is that,
by bearing an additional cost, this developer can credibly commit to choosing the
equilibrium strategy of his preferred equilibrium. Because the other developers ob-
10 This possibility emerges because, at ICO, a developer could sell more tokens than what nec-
essary to pay the entry cost, invest the proceeding in the risk free asset and then purchase back
some of his tokens on the market in period 1. As we will show later, without loss of generality, we
can focus on equilibria in which this never happens. The reason is that, in equilibrium, the return
on holding tokens is the same as holding the risk free asset.
11 In the literature, this a useless-but-costly action is usually assumed to be “money burning”.
The problem with this interpretation is that if a developer’s cash constraint is binding, then this
developer has no money to burn. The forward induction logic, however, applies to any form of
action that generates a cost to the player but has no impact on the payoffs of the game. For
example, there could be a second dimension of effort that has no impact neither on quality of the
decentralized platform but is nonetheless observed by the other developers.
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serve this, they will therefore coordinate on the equilibrium chosen by the developer
who took the costly action. Interestingly, this works also if no useless-but-costly
action is taken on the equilibrium path. Also, these actions are not observable by
investors and hence can be used only to coordinate the equilibrium strategies of
developers, and not to manipulate the price of the token (which depends on the
investors’ beliefs over the developers future actions).
For each developer, therefore, the possibility of taking a useless-but-costly action
restricts the set of possible equilibria to a subsect of the full set of equilibria. In
our refinement, we consider the union of these subsets. That is, we check, for each
developer, which equilibria are eliminated when only this developer is allowed to
take a useless-but-costly action, and then consider all the surviving equilibria as
plausible.12 If multiple equilibria survive this refinement, then we focus on the
symmetric equilibrium: the equilibrium in which identical developers play identical
equilibrium strategies.
3 Solution
3.1 Price of tokens from period 2 onward
We start by solving for the price of the token associated with the winning platform.
The fact that no development is possible after period 2 implies that the price of the
token associated with the winning platform must be constant from period 2 onward.
Investors are therefore unwilling to hold any token. Because the demand for tokens






Note that the above equation is a version of the equation of exchange, used in
macroeconomics to link money supply (here M), economic activity (here ew), price
12 When multiple players are allowed to useless-but-costly actions, then Ben-Porath and Dekel
(1992) show that their ability to select an equilibrium depends on the order in which those actions
are taken.
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level, and velocity of money (here assumed 1).13 With respect to the non-winning
platforms, because they are not used, their associated tokens have prices equal to
zero.
Before continuing with the derivation of the solution, an important observation.
The presence of the investors guarantees that, if a token is traded on the market in




· pr{i = w},




· pr{i = w}.
The important observation is that what is known by investors and hence is used
to compute the expectation changes from period 0 to period 1. In an ICO, the
developer announces the supply of tokens and investors submit bids. The developer’s
announcement is used to compute the expectation, and hence determines the token
price at ICO. On the market, instead, investors are price takers, which implies
that their demand for tokens depends exclusively on p1 and E[p2], and not on the
quantity of tokens sold by the developer in period 1.14 To say it differently, in period
1 investors form an expectation with respect to future effort that does not depend
on period-1 supply of tokens. This expectation is correct in equilibrium (that is,
for the equilibrium supply of tokens in period 1 and subsequent effort) but will not
react to deviations from the equilibrium. From the developers view point, therefore,
the supply of tokens in period 1 does not affect the equilibrium price for tokens in
that period. However, as we will see, the supply of tokens in period 1 determines the
developers’ effort, and hence the price of the token in period 2.
13 Using the the equation of exchange to determine the price of cryptocurrencies is also in Bolt
and Van Oordt (2020).
14 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point is simply
that in a price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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3.2 Equilibrium effort
Consider the choice of effort in period 2. We order the developers so that the first
n ≥ 0 are that active ones, that is, those who paid the entry cost. Of those, the first
r ∈ {0, ..., n} are rrich: they paid the entry cost without holding the ICO in period
0. The subsequent n − r are poor: they paid the entry cost and held the ICO in
period 0.
In period 2 all developers will sell their entire stock of tokens. Given this, when











The developers are therefore engaged in an asymmetric contest with productive




is the optimal effort whenever




is the effort level
at which a developer’s utility is zero even if he wins with probability 1. Call the
developer with the highest Qi2 the leader and the developer with the second-highest
Qi2 the follower.15 Define Ql ≡ maxiQi2 and Qf ≡ maxi 6=lQi2 as the tokens held by
leader and follower, respectively.
When 2Qf ≤ Ql the leader’s unconstrained optimal effort is larger then the
follower’s largest possible effort. In this case, in the unique equilibrium of the game,








while all other developers earn zero. If instead 2Qf2 > Ql, then the leader’s uncon-
strained optimal effort is strictly below the follower’s largest possible effort. In this
case, there are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria. However, by Theorem 1 in Siegel
15 Whenever leader and follower have the same Qi2, we say that there are multiple leaders.
Although we do not explicitly mention it, our results extend to this case as well. See, in particular,
Equation (3) in Proposition 1.
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That is, the leader’s utility is equal to the utility he would achieve if he’d set his
effort equal to the follower’s largest possible effort.16 Also here, the utility of all
other developers is zero. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 (Period 2 utility). Define Qi = maxj 6=i{Qj2}. In all equilibria of the
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2Qi(Qi2−Qi)
M2









Proof. By direct application of Siegel (2014), Theorem 1.
See Figure 2. For future reference, note that, given the shape of U∗2 (Qi,Qi), ran-
domizing over values of Qi2 makes the developer better off, strictly so when i could
be both a leader and a follower depending on the realization Qi2.
To derive the equilibrium period-2 prices of tokens, we again distinguish between
two cases. As already mentioned, if 2Qf ≤ Ql there is a unique equilibrium in pure
strategy: the leader sets effort equal to Q
l
M
and wins with probability 1; all other





All other developers’ tokens have price equal to zero.
If instead 2Qf > Ql, then multiple, mixed strategies Nash equilibria exist. To
each equilibrium of the game corresponds the same equilibrium payoffs, but a dif-
ferent distribution of effort by leader and follower, and expected prices of tokens
16 This result is also in Siegel (2009), in which however only non-productive effort is considered.
Siegel (2014) extends these results to cases in which, over some range, the “prize” to be won by a
player may be increasing in this player’s effort. Note also that the fact that the equilibrium payoffs




Fig. 2: Player i’s payoff in period 2, as a function of Qi2.
(where the expectation is taken at the beginning of period 2 with respect to effort).
Deriving the full set of equilibrium effort is, in general, quite convoluted. However,
there is a particular case that will be relevant on the equilibrium path and that we
can explicitly solve: the case in which either a developer holds a given amount of
tokens, or he holds no tokens.
Proposition 2 (Prices in period 2). Suppose that for i ≤ k ≤ n we have Qi = Ql,
while for k < i ≤ n we have Qi = 0. If k ≥ 2, then set of equilibria of the





, while the remaining developers set effort equal to zero with probability 1.









where the expectation is taken at the beginning of period 2, before effort is set. If










otherwise E[pi2] = 0.
An important consequence of the above proposition is that, going from a single
active developer to multiple active developers always increases the value of the
winning platform: that is, in any equilibrium with k ≥ 2 the expected value of the
winning platform is larger than with k = 1. Conditional on having more than 2
active developers, the value of the winning platform is maximized when only two
developers take part in the competition, while all other developers set effort equal
to zero.
As already discussed, here we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. In this equi-
librium, whenever there are k > 1 leaders and all other developers have zero tokens,
then all k developers randomize. The value of the winning platform is given in




with probability 1. Finally, if k = 0 then no developer will exert effort and
the value of the winning platform will be zero. We can therefore write the expected
value of the winning platform in the symmetric equilibrium as a function of k as:
E[ew] =
2k






where 1 is the indicator function, so that 1{k 6= 1} takes value 1 if k > 1 or k = 0,










if i ≤ k
0 otherwise
(5)
In this class of equilibria, competition has a non-monotonic effect on the value of
the winning platform: the expected value of the winning platform increases with k
for k ≤ 2, but decreases with k for k ≥ 2. Finally, a fact that we will use extensively








3.3 Sale of tokens in period 1
Consider now the choice of Qi2, that is, for the developers who held an ICO, how














Q̄i = max{Qi1 ≤M | (ai + pi0(M −Qi1))R ≤ I i + max{pi1(Qi2 −Qi1), 0}} (7)
that is, Q̄i is the largest Qi2 ≤ M satisfying the developer’s cash constraint (1).




i)] is developer i’s expected period 2 utility (as defined in Proposition
3), where the expectation is taken with respect to Qi (developer i’s opponents may
be randomizing).
The fist observation is that if there is at least one rich developer j ≤ r, then for
all other developers i 6= j we have Qi = M and their continuation utility is zero. In
this case, all tokens that are traded in period 1 (those belonging to poor developers)
must have price equal to zero, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3. Suppose that r > 0. Then, in equilibrium, every developer i ∈
{r + 1, ..., n} chooses Qi2 = 0 so that ei = 0 and pi1 = pi2 = 0.
The intuition for the above result is quite straightforward. If developer i holds
enough tokens in period 2, he may be expected to set strictly positive effort with
some probability. But then, the period-1 price of his token should be strictly positive.
This, however, cannot be an equilibrium: if Qi = M , developer i is better off selling
all his tokens in period 1 (and earn strictly positive payoff) rather than holding
tokens until period 2 (and earn zero). In equilibrium, therefore, it must be that
Qi2 = 0, so that effort is zero in period 2.17
17 Note that effort could be zero also if Qi2 > 0 but low. Hence, whereas period-2 effort, period 1
price and period 2 price are zero in every equilibrium, the equilibrium token holding is not uniquely
identified.
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By the above proposition, only rich developers will be active on the market in
period 2. Proposition 2 then directly implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If r > 0, then in a symmetric equilibrium the expected value of the
winning platform is given by (4) and the price of tokens is given by (5), with k = r
and Ql = M .
Consider now the case r = 0 and n > 0, that is, all active developers are poor.




i)] is convex in Qi2, strictly so if developer i is the only leader for some
Qi2 and some realizations of Qi.18 This implies that the developer’s maximization
problem can only have corner solutions: he sets either Qi2 = 0, or Qi2 = Q̄i (as
defined in 7), or he randomizes between these two values.
Second, pi1 must be such that investors are indifferent between purchasing tokens
or the risk free asset. This gives rise to an anti-coordination problem between
investors and each developer. The reason is that if investors expect developer i to
hold on to his tokens and exert high effort tomorrow, this should already be priced
into pi1. But then this developer should sell all his tokens in period 1 and invest in
the risk free asset. This way, he can benefit from his future effort without exerting
any. Similarly, if investors expect a developer to hold no tokens in period 2, then
the period-1 price of this token should be zero. But then, as long as this developer
can be the leader with positive probability in period 2, such developer should hold
on to all his tokens.
These two observations imply that, in equilibrium, all developers will randomize
between holding the maximum amount of tokens (and therefore putting high effort
in the following period) or no tokens (and therefore putting no effort in the following
period), as the next proposition shows.19
18 To see this, consider a specific Qi2 and Qi. By Proposition 1, we can write αU2(x,Qi) + (1−
α)U2(y,Q
i) ≥ U2(αx+(1−α)y,Qi) for all x, y ∈ [0, Qi1] and α ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the inequality







is convex, it is enough to integrate both sides over the possible values of Qi.
19 A note on our forward-looking equilibrium selection criterion. In every possible equilibria,
developers are indifferent between selling all their tokens or holding on to all their tokens. Hence,
in all equilibria, a developer i’s payoff is equal to pi1Qi1R (i.e., what he would earn if he sold all
his tokens in period 1). Because, by assumption, the useless-but-costly action is not observable by
investors, this action does not affect the period 1 market price. It follows that, given such prices,
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Proposition 4 (Market equilibrium in period 1). Suppose r = 0 and n > 0 (that
is, only poor developers are present). In the period-1 market equilibrium all devel-
opers randomize between 0 and Q̄i, where Q̄i is the largest Qi2 ≤ M satisfying the
developer’s cash constraint (1) (see 7).
If, furthermore, all developers are identical (i.e. same Qi1 and same Q̄i), then in
the symmetric equilibrium the probability that each developer sets Qi2 = 0 is τ(n),
implicitly defined as













2(j + 1)− 1{j 6= 0}
(8)

















The corresponding value of the winning platform is:20




Note that, by equation 8, τ(n) increases with n. Hence, as the number of com-
petitors in the market increases, in the symmetric equilibrium the probability that
a single developer liquidates all his token increases. This has an ambiguous effect
on the equilibrium prices: from the point of view of a given developer, it is now
more likely that a given opponent liquidates his tokens, but the number of oppo-
nents increases. Similarly, changes in n have an ambiguous effect on the value of the
winning platform. We therefore resort to numerical calculations, reported in Table
1.
The first order effects is that, as the number of competitors increases, the prob-
ability that all developers but one liquidate their tokens decreases. This in turns
decreases the price of each individual token because each developer is more likely to
have a competitor and, in equilibrium, this developer must be indifferent between
all equilibria yield the same payoffs to all developers, and hence our forward-looking equilibrium
refinement is mute.
20 The expectation here is taken after the developers paid the entry cost, before the market opens.
3 Solution 23
Qi2 = 0 and Qi2 = Q̄i. The calculations also show that the expected value of the
winning platform is monotonically increasing with n. Hence, if all developers are
poor, competition is always beneficial. This is in sharp contrast with the case r > 0
in which, as we saw, the value of the winning platform is maximized at r = 2.
A related observation is that, by Proposition 3, if r = 1 then the value of the
winning platform will be 1. It is possible, therefore, that the value of the winning
platform is greater when there are sufficiently many poor developers and no rich
developers.21 If instead there are two developers who did not hold an ICO, then
the value of the winning platform will be 2, which is always above the value of the
winning platform when any numbers of developers held an ICO. Intuitively, relative
to a situation in which a single developer self-financed the entry cost, having multiple
ICOs implies two things. On the one hand, there could be multiple competitors in
period 2, which increases expected effort. On the other hand, in equilibrium it is
possible that all developers liquidate their tokens. If sufficiently many developers
held an ICO, the first effect dominates, which implies that it is better to have several
developers who held an ICO. Of course, if there are two developers who did not hold
an ICO, then we have the best of both words: competition will push these developers
to exert effort, but without the risk that they liquidate all their tokens in period 1.
We summarize these observations in the following remark.
Remark 1. The value of the winning platform is the largest possible when r = 2
(i.e., there are two rich developers). If Q̄ is sufficiently large, then the value of
the winning protocol is greater with r = 0 and n sufficiently large (i.e., no rich
developers but sufficiently many poor developers), then with r = 1 (i.e., a single rich
developer).
3.4 Period 1: entry cost.
Consider now the choice of paying the entry cost. It is useful to reorder the devel-
opers in the following way. The first ñ ≥ 0 developers have enough funds to pay
the entry cost. Of those, the first r̃ ≥ 0 did not hold an ICO so that, by definition
21 In particular, this would be the case if there are no rich developers, at least 12 poor developers,
and for these developers Q̄ is either greater or sufficiently close to M .
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n τ(n) τ(n)n−1 nτ(n)n−1
1 1/2 1 1
2 0.6375 0.6375 1.274
3 0.6976 0.4866 1.46
4 0.7353 0.3975 1.5902
5 0.7622 0.3375 1.6874
6 0.7827 0.2938 1.763
7 0.7992 0.2605 1.8234
8 0.8127 0.2341 1.8728
9 0.8241 0.2127 1.914
10 0.8339 0.1949 1.949
11 0.8423 0.1799 1.9788
12 0.85 0.167 2.0044
13 0.8565 0.1559 2.0272
20 0.8888 0.1064 2.1284
30 0.9138 0.0731 2.1944
100 0.9625 0.0227 2.2672
Tab. 1: Probability of liquidating all tokens (τ(n)), price of each token (∝ τ(n)n−1)
and expected value of the winning platform (∝ nτ(n)n−1) as a function of
n. Symmetric equilibrium for r = 0.
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Qi1 = M for i ≤ r̃. The remaining developers held an ICO and therefore have
Q̄i ≤M .22
Suppose r̃ > 0. If
1
2
≥ C ·R, (9)
then entry by at least one developer i ≤ r̃ is profitable. In this case, there are r̃
equilibria in which a single developer i ≤ r̃ pays the entry cost. There are also
equilibria in mixed strategy in which multiple developers randomize between paying
the entry cost or not. It is clear however that these equilibria do not survive our
forward-induction refinement: by taking a useless-but-costly action a developer i ≤ r̃
can signal its intention to pay the entry cost with probability one, therefore deterring
all other developers from paying the entry cost.23 We summarize these observation
in the following proposition (we omit its proof).
Proposition 5. Suppose r̃ > 0. If
1
2
≥ C ·R (10)
Then the equilibria robust to our forward-looking refinement are those in which only
a single developer i ≤ r̃ pays the entry cost. The value of the winning protocol is
therefore:
ew = 1.
If (10) is violated, then in equilibrium no developer pays the entry cost.
From now on, we always assume that (10) holds.









22 Note that, if a developer held an ICO and Q̄i = M , this developer was rich enough to pay the
fixed cost without holding an ICO. We show later that, in equilibrium, no developer who is rich
enough to pay the fixed cost holds an ICO. Hence, on the equilibrium path, for all developers who
held an ICO we have Q̄i < M .
23 Note that if a developer j with r̃ < j ≤ ñ signals his intention to pay the fixed cost in the
same way, a developer i ≤ r̃ will still find it profitable to enter. The reason is that, by Proposition
3, if both i and j pay the fixed cost, j will liquidate all his tokens on the market and never reach
period 2.
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≥ C ·R, (11)
Suppose now that (11) holds and assume that all developers are identical. In

















≥ C ·R (12)
in equilibrium all developers with enough resources pay the entry cost with proba-







< C ·R, (13)
then, again, if all developers with enough resources pay the fixed cost, then prof-
its will be negative. Hence, the only equilibrium surviving our forward-induction












The following proposition summarizes these observations (we omit its proof).
Proposition 6. Suppose that r̃ = 0, that (11) holds, and that all developers are iden-
tical. In the equilibrium robust to our forward-looking refinement n = min{ñ, n̂(Q̄)}
developers pay the entry cost.
It is interesting to note that the above equilibrium may not be the only one









then there are also equilibria in which n̂(Q̄)− 1 pay the entry cost for sure, and an
additional developer randomizes. We have not expicitly mentioned them because,
when considering the ICO stage, these equilibria are never reached. For a more
detailed discussion, see the Mathematical appendix, Remark on Proposition 6.
By Proposition 3, therefore, as long as ñ < n̂(Q̄), increasing ñ increases the
expected value of the winning protocol and the sum of the token prices, while de-
creasing the price of each individual token. If instead ñ > n̂(Q̄), then the equilibrium
level of entry (and hence the value of the winning protocol and the prices of tokens)
are independent of ñ.
3.5 Period 0: the ICO.
To start, suppose r̃ > 0: some developers have enough own resources to pay the
entry cost without holding an ICO. The following Lemma follows directly from
Proposition 5.
Lemma 1. Suppose r̃ > 0, that is, max{ai} ≥ CR . In this case there is no ICO in
period 0.24 In the subsequent period a single developer i ≤ r̃ pays the entry cost.
The expected value of the winning platform is ew = 1.
Hence, the presence of even a single developer who is sufficiently rich effectively
prevents all other developers from raising funds at ICO. The equilibrium outcome
is therefore a monopoly.
Suppose no developer has enough resources to pay the entry cost C. Note that,
because the ICO is modeled as an auction, first investors learn Qi1, and then they
form an expectation with respect to the developer’s behavior in period 1 and hence





Furthermore, a developer holding the ICO should raise sufficient funds to pay
24 More precisely, there could be ICOs with equilibrium price equal to zero. We consider this
possibility as equivalent to “no ICO”.
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the entry cost25
(ai + pi0(M −Qi1))R = C. (15)
Finally, the investors’ expectation with respect to the developer’s behavior in period
1 should be correct. For example, if investors expect developer i to pay the entry
cost, then p01 should reflect this. In equilibrium, the developer should be able to sell
sufficiently few tokens at p01 so to be willing to pay the entry cost in period 1.
The next proposition uses these three conditions to characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Suppose maxi{ai} < CR . There is always an equilibrium in which
there is no ICOs nor entry in equilibrium.













Then any Q∗1 ≥M
√
2C solution to:






is an equilibrium in which ñ(Q∗1) developers hold an ICO, each of them sellingM−Q∗1
tokens.
For intuition, note that pi1(Q∗1) is the price for tokens in period 1, when all devel-
opers holding an ICO sellM−Q∗1 tokens and, as a consequence, n̂(Q∗1) developer pay
the fixed cost. Note also that, as Q∗1 increases, if n̂(Q∗1) stays constant then pi1(Q∗1)
will increase. It is however possible that increasing Q∗1 leads to an increase in the
number of competitors n̂(Q∗1) and to a discontinuous drop in pi1(Q∗1). Condition (16)
comes from (15) and guarantees that, at ICO price equal to pi1(Q∗1)/R, a developer
selling M − Q∗1 tokens raises enough money to pay the fixed cost in the following
25 A technical note. A developer could sell at ICO more tokens that what required to pay the
entry cost, and then use the extra funds to invest in the risk-free asset and then, possibly, purchase
back his tokens in period 1. These extra funds yield a return R, which in equilibrium is equal
to the return on tokens. Hence, developers are indifferent between selling extra tokens or not.
Furthermore, Proposition 4 shows that pi1 depends on Q̄i. By definition, Q̄i is the largest number
of tokens that a developer can purchase in period 1 given his cash constraint (1), and is the same
independently of whether the developer sells extra tokens in period 0. For ease of exposition, here
we focus on the equilibria in which no extra tokens are sold at ICO.
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period. Finally, the condition Q∗1 ≥ M
√
2C guarantees that (11) holds at Q∗1, and
hence it is incentive compatible for at least one developer having enough funds to
actually pay the fixed cost.
There are therefore multiple equilibria. One source of equilibrium multiplicity
are off equilibrium beliefs: if investors believe that no developer will pay the entry
cost in the future, then it is not possible to raise funds at ICO. This is always an
equilibrium because no developer is given the chance to invest, and hence investors’
beliefs cannot be shown to be incorrect.
Furthermore, an equilibrium with ICOs may or may not exist. This may happen
for two reasons. Note that the largest possible value of Q∗1 is M , and at this value
we have
















Clearly, this situation is more likely to emerge when C − aR is large, and never
emerges when C − aR is sufficiently small. Hence, if developers are too poor, there
is no equilibrium with ICO. In this case, developers can raise enough funds to pay
the fixed cost only by selling many tokens. But by doing so they have no more
incentive to pay the fixed cost in the following period.
An equilibrium with ICO may fail to exist also because of an integer problem:
there are value of Q∗1 such that






but because n̂(Q∗1) jumps discontinuously at some values of Q∗1 equation (16) never
holds. In this case, it is possible to show that an equilibrium with ICO exists
provided that a public randomization device is available.26
26 In such equilibrium, each of n̂(Q∗1) developers announces how many tokens to sell at ICO and
investors then submit bids. Each developer may then cancel the ICO (in which case investors
do not pay anything). After the bids are submitted, a fair public randomization device is used
to identify a single developer among the n̂(Q∗1), who will then randomize between canceling his
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Finally, note that (16) may have multiple solutions and hence there could be
multiple equilibria with ICOs. The intuition here is the following. As Q∗1 increases,
as long as n̂(Q∗1) does not change the corresponding token price pi1(Q∗1) will increase.
This is because investors expect higher effort in the future, and hence are willing
to pay a larger price. But if this is the case, then the developer needs to sell fewer
tokens at ICO in order to pay the entry cost, which implies that his future effort
will be high. Conversely, if Q∗1 is low, then pi1(Q∗1) will be low, in which case the
developer will need to sell many tokens to cover the entry cost. This can be seen as
a coordination problem between investors and developers. This logic is mitigated
(but not fully eliminated) by the fact that, as Q∗1 increases n̂(Q∗1) may also increase.
In this case, additional competition will drive the price of each token down.
4 Welfare
Our measure of welfare is the expected value of the winning protocol. As already
discussed, if there is at least one developer with enough resources to pay the entry
cost, then a single developer will enter and the equilibrium value of the winning
protocol is 1.
If instead there is no developer who can pay the entry cost, then, by Proposition








where Q∗1 is defined in (16). If, furthermore, we have a→ CR then Q
∗
1 →M and
E[ew]→ ñ(M)τ(ñ(M))ñ(M)−1 · 1
2
In this case, welfare with ICOs is larger than welfare without ICOs as long as
ñ(M)τ(ñ(M))ñ(M)−1 > 2 or ñ(M) ≥ 12 (see Table 1). By definition of ñ(M), this
would indeed be the case if, for example, C is sufficiently low.
The key observation is that, despite the fact that ICOs decrease each developers’
ICO or not. Note also that this equilibrium is strictly preferred by all n̂(Q∗1) developers to the
equilibrium with no ICOs. See the proof of the proposition for more details.
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incentive, they also stimulate entry. Overall, welfare will be higher with ICOs (than
without) when the loss of incentives is contained (becauseQ∗1 is sufficiently large) and
when ICOs allow sufficiently many developers to enter. An interesting implication
is that welfare is non-monotonic in the cost of entry: welfare may be higher when
C is high (and hence ICO occur in equilibrium) than when C is low (and hence no
ICO occurs in equilibrium).
5 Conclusion
ICOs have received a number of criticism, both in the popular press and in the
academic domain. In particular, Canidio (2018) considers a single developer and
shows that ICOs, like all forms of outside financing weakens incentives. Specific to
this environment, if a developer holds an ICO, then in all subsequent periods there
is a positive probability that this developer will liquidate all his tokens and stop
the development of his decentralized digital platform—essentially, this developer
may exit the market prematurely. Here we show that this result is robust to the
introduction of multiple developers. However, precisely because of that, then ICOs
stimulate entry.27 This has a positive effect, because entry stimulates competition
and effort.
From the view point of the regulator, our model highlights two things. First,
there could be equilibria with ICOs and entry next to equilibria without ICOs.
Hence, the regulator’s role could be to help achieve the equilibrium with ICOs and
entry. Second, as already discussed, welfare is sometimes larger when there is entry
with ICOs than without ICOs. This implies that a regulator may want to increase
the cost of entry (possibly via a tax), so to induce developers to hold ICOs and
hence stimulate entry.
We believe that the model can be extended in several directions. For example,
there could be a second dimension of effort (for example, marketing effort) affecting
the probability that a platform is the winning platform, without changing its under-
27 It is important to stress that, whereas all forms of external financing weaken incentives, not
all forms of external financing stimulate entry. So, for example, external financing in the form of
a sale of equity weakens incentives because it reduces effort, which however will be exerted with
probability 1. In this case only one developer will enter the market because a second developer
will for sure earn zero profits., which is the same with or without external financing.
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lying platform. This effort is therefore welfare reducing, because it may induce users
to adopt an inferior platform. Introducing this second dimension of effort may make
competition less desirable. The reason is that, when a single developer pays the en-
try cost, all effort is productive. When multiple developers are present, however,
some effort may be unproductive. Studying the competitive dynamics and welfare
properties of the equilibrium under this different assumption is left for future work.
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. A player’s equilibrium strategy is a function F i(x) = pr{ei ≤
x}, representing the probability that developer i chooses effort level below a given
threshold x. Remember that the existence of the equilibrium is already in Siegel
(2014). The goal here is to derive the equilibrium strategies, for then determining
the equilibrium prices and equilibrium value of the winning platform.
A couple of preliminary observations. First, there cannot be a pure strategy
equilibrium and hence at least two players must randomize over positive effort values.
We say that developers i ≤ z with 2 ≤ z ≤ k set strictly positive effort with strictly
positive probability, while the other developers set effort equal to zero. Hence, for
i > z we have F i(x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0. The second observation is that, for every


















so that developer i earns zero profits by choosing effort x if and only if:
∏
j 6=i




Consider an equilibrium. For this equilibrium, write the CDF of ew = maxi{ei}





F j(x) = F i(x)
∏
j 6=i




where the first equality follows from the fact that the probability that the maximum
of multiple random variables is below a given threshold is equal to the probability
that all these random variables are below this same threshold.
The above expression implies that for i, j ≤ z we have Fi(x) = Fj(x) ≡ F (x).
That is, if two leaders i and j set strictly positive effort with strictly positive prob-































































Note that, because all developer i ≤ z have the same strategy, they must have the








Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a poor developer i. Suppose that, in equilibrium
Qi2 is sufficiently large so that i’s expected effort is strictly positive, either because
he is the follower in a mixed strategy equilibrium, or because he is one of multiple
leaders. If there is also a rich developer, however, developer i’s continuation utility
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is zero. But because expected effort is strictly positive, then pi1 > 0. This cannot
be an equilibrium because, clearly, if pi1 > 0 the developer is better off to sell all his
tokens in period 1 and exert no effort in period 2.
Hence, in equilibrium Qi2 must be such that period-2 effort is zero and hence
pi1 = 0. Clearly, Qi2 = 0 is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose Qi1 > 0 for some i.
Step 1: in equilibrium, at least one developer earns strictly positive profits.
In any equilibrium, there must exist a developer y with Qy1 > 0 who earns strictly
positive profits. Suppose not. In this case, the only possible equilibrium is one in
which pi1 = 0 for all i. The reason is the same discussed in the proof of Proposition
3: if period 1 prices were positive, then developers would be better off to sell all their
tokens in period 1, which cannot be an equilibrium. But because there are no rich
developers, pi1 = 0 for all i is not an equilibrium either. The reason is that a single
developer could hold on to his tokens, become the unique leader in the following
period and earn strictly positive profits.
Step 2: in equilibrium, the developer earning strictly positive profits ran-
domizes. If developer y earns strictly positive profits, then he is the unique leader
for some Qy2 and some (or all) realizations of Qy. For given investors’ belief about
period-2 effort (and period-2 prices) period-1 prices are fully determined and equal to
py1 = E[e
y]pr{y = w}/R. Hence, developer y’s objective function is convex (strictly
so somewhere) in Qy2, and his maximization problem must have a corner solution.
Therefore, we can represent each developer’s equilibrium strategy by τy ∈ [0, 1] the
probability that developer y sets Qy2 = 0, with 1− τy being the probability that the
developer sets Qy2 = Q̄y.
Consider now the investors. If in equilibrium τ y = 0, then, with probability
1, effort will be high in period 2. This effort will be priced into period 1 price.
But given this, the developer should sell all his tokens and invest in the risk-free
asset. This way, he can benefit from his future effort before exerting any, and hence
without paying the cost of effort. This establishes that, in any equilibrium, it must
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be that τ y > 0. If, in equilibrium, τ y = 1, then because ey2 = 0, the period 1 price
of token y is zero. The developer can earn the exact same payoff by holding on to
his token until period 2 and setting ey2 = 0. He can do strictly better if he holds
on to his token until period 2 and sets ey2 optimally. Hence τ y = 1 cannot be an
equilibrium.
Hence, in equilibrium it must be that τy ∈ (0, 1), which can only be the case if
developer y is indifferent between setting Qy2 = 0 and Q
y
2 = Q̄























Step 3: all developers with Qi1 > 0 randomize. Conditional on developer y
liquidating all his tokens, by repeating the same argument in Step 1, there must be
another developer x that will be the unique leader for some Qx2 and some realizations
of Qx. By step 2 above, this developer must randomize between Qx2 = 0 and
Qx2 = Q̄
x.
By repeating the same argument, every developer with Qi1 > 0 has a strictly pos-
itive probability of being the unique leader in period 2 for some Qi2. This probability
is equal to the probability that all other developers sell all their tokens in period 1.
Hence, in equilibrium every developer with Qi1 > 0 must randomize between Qi2 = 0
and Qi2 = Q̄i.
Step 4: characterization of the equilibrium probabilities for the case of iden-
tical developers. To characterize the equilibrium probabilities, assume that all
developers are identical (so that Q̄i = Q̄ for all i) and consider the symmetric equi-
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At the same time, by (5), for investors to be indifferent it must be that







(1− τ)jτn−1−j · Q̄
M2
· 2






(1− τ)jτn−j−1 is the probability that, among all developers other than
i, there are j developers who do not liquidate their tokens. Because (1 − τ) is the







is the probability that player i and j other developers did not liquidate their tokens,
and hence in the following period there are j + 1 leaders with Q̄ tokens. By using














2(j + 1)− 1{j > 0}
Note that the RHS of the above expression is strictly decreasing in τ , goes to infinity
for τ → 0 and to zero for τ → 1. It follows that the above expression has a unique
solution. Furthermore, because the RHS of the above expression is strictly increasing
in n, the equilibrium τ must be increasing in n.
Finally, by (6), the expected value of the winning platform is





where the last equality follows from the expression for pi1R derived earlier.
Remark on Proposition 6. To characterize the full set of equilibria, Proposition 6
should be modified in the following way:
Proposition 8. Suppose that r̃ = 0, that (11) holds, and that all developers are
identical. The equilibria robust to our forward-looking refinement are:
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then n developers pay the entry cost, where n = min{ñ, n̂(Q̄)}.








then in all equilibria n̂(Q̄)−1 developers enter with probability 1, while a single
additional developer enters with probability between 0 and 1 (included).
It is therefore possible that when n̂(Q̄)−1 developers enter they all earn positive
profits, but if an additional developer enters all developers earn zero profits (in the
sense that their continuation utility equals C). This additional developer is therefore
indifferent between entering or not and, in equilibrium, may randomize. Note also
that this equilibrium survives our forward looking refinement because the additional
developer is indifferent between entering or nor—even if he knows for sure that the
other n̂(Q̄)− 1 developers will enter for sure. Note also that when ñ ≥ n̂(Q̄) there
is no symmetric equilibrium because all developers are identical but some developer
will pay the entry cost and some will not.
If, in equilibrium, n̂(Q̄)−1 developers enter for sure with an additional developer


















that is, depending on how the additional developer randomizes, any E[pi1] within
the above interval can emerge in equilibrium. The n̂(Q̄)th developer, instead, ran-














The problem with this equilibrium is that, from period 0 viewpoint, it implies
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that n̂(Q̄) identical developers are able to raise funds at ICO, but not all at the
same price. But this cannot happen in equilibrium: identical developers cannot all
raise C
R
− a at ICO by selling he same amount of tokens but at different prices.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Proposition 5 we know that if every developer i ≤ r̃ holds
an ICO, then a single developer j ≤ r̃ is better off to not hold the ICO and conquer
the entire market. Hence there is no equilibrium in which every developer i ≤ r̃
holds an ICO.
Given that at least one developer i ≤ r̃ does not hold an ICO, then no other
developer can sell tokens at ICO at a strictly positive price. That is because, by
Proposition 3, their token will be worth zero in the following period.
If at least one developer i ≤ r̃ does not hold an ICO, all other developers are
indifferent between not holding an ICO and holding an ICO in which their tokens
are sold at zero price. In the symmetric equilibrium no developer i ≤ r̃ holds an
ICO. The other developers i ≥ r̃ may break their indifference either way.
The lemma follows by considering the case of “ICO with price zero” equivalent
to “no ICO”.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose investors expect that, if a developer raises enough
funds to pay the entry cost, then (11) will be violated in period 1. Then pi0 = pi1 = 0.
No developer is able to raise funds at ICO. Although whether (??) holds or not is
never observed (i.e., the investors beliefs are off equilibrium), no ICO is indeed an
equilibrium.
Suppose investors expect (11) holds. Again, we focus on the symmetric equilib-
rium, in which all firms holding an ICO sells the same number of tokens. Call n∗
and Q∗1 < M the equilibrium number of firms holding an ICO and number of tokens
not sold at ICO, respectively. Note that, for given Q∗1, it must be that n∗ = n̂(Q∗1)
(where n̂() is defined in 14). If n∗ > n̂(Q∗1) then some of the developers holding
the ICO will not pay the entry cost, which quickly leads to a contradiction (these
developers should not be able to raise funds at ICO in the first place); if n∗ < n̂(Q∗1)
then some developers who are not holding an ICO could successfully hold one, pay
the entry cost and earn positive profits in equilibrium. It follows that n∗ = n̂(Q∗1)
is a piecewise increasing function of Q∗1.
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as the period-1 price as a function of Q∗1. Note that if Q∗1 increases without changing
n∗ = n̂(Q∗1), then the corresponding price pi1(Q∗1) increases as well. As Q∗1 increases
further, however, n∗ = ñ may also increase. At such Q∗1, pi1(Q∗1) has a downward
discontinuity.
Knowing this, using (15) together with the fact that p0 = p1R , we can characterize
the equilibrium by the following equation






If at Q∗1 solution to the above equation (11) holds, then such Q∗1 is an equilibrium.
Note that (11) holds at Q∗1 if and only if Q∗1 ≥M
√
2C.
As discussed in the body of the text, the above equation may not have a solution
(and hence an equilibrium with ICO may not exist) because of an integer problem:










X < M − C − aR
pi1(X)
.
In this case, there is an equilibrium in which:
• ñ(X) developers announce the sale of M −X tokens at ICO. Investors submit
bids.
• using a fair public randomization device, a single developer is selected. This
developer then will cancel the ICO with some probability. If the ICO is can-
celed, then investors do not have to pay anything.
To start, note that each developer has the same probability of canceling his ICO, and
hence investors should submit the same bids to all developers. It follows that the
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equilibrium ICO price is the same for all developers who run an ICO. Furthermore,
there exists a probability of canceling the ICO such that
X = M − C − aR
pi1(X)
.
and hence the price of the token is such that if all n̂(X) developers hold an ICO,
they all raise enough funds to pay the entry cost.
Finally, by definition, X is such that n̂(X) developers finds it (weakly) profitable
to pay the fixed cost. However, at any Q1 < X we have that strictly fewer than









Hence, all ñ(X) developers will pay the entry cost in period 1, but they all make
zero profits. This implies that knowing that the other X − 1 developers will hold
the ICO for sure, developer X is indifferent between holding it or not, and hence
may randomize. The other X−1 developers earn positive expected profits (because
with some probability there will not be an additional ICO) and hence they strictly
prefer to run the ICO for sure.
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